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Executive Summary  
On March 28 and 29, 2018, the inaugural PETRAS/IET Living in the IoT Conference took place 
at the Institution of Engineering and Technology, London. As part of this event, the PETRAS 
Standards, Governance and Policy (SGP) team hosted a workshop on March 27 to explore 
how global policy approaches to the cyber security of the IoT could be improved to achieve 
more effective cybersecurity governance across the IoT ecosystem.  
 Key workshop messages: 
1. The IoT is not yet discussed in any depth at forums where global cyber security is 
taken up. 
2. Policymaking at the pace of change of emerging technologies like the IoT is 
difficult in a domestic context and coordination at the international level will be 
much more so.  
3. Innovation in the governance of technology emerging from the technical 
community has not been replicated in the policy community. 
4. Policymakers and those in the technical community face persistent 
communication challenges that go beyond terminology. Understanding one 
another's perspectives better will be fundamental to moving forward with a 
global approach to shared cyber security problems in the IoT.  
5. While policymakers would benefit from more technical literacy, the reverse is 
equally important. The technical community would greatly benefit from a better 
understanding of policy processes. 
6. A much more effective dialogue between the policymaking and technical 
communities needs to be established to move forward. One way to do this will 
be to create a global community of researchers and practitioners who work 
specifically to communicate better and develop a shared knowledge space. 
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The impetus for this workshop was the recognition that international policy cooperation on 
the cybersecurity aspects of the IoT has made little progress. This is due in part to a failure to 
establish a functioning community of technicians and policymakers who are jointly focusing 
on these issues. From a technical perspective, the IoT will significantly increase opportunities 
to breach security via new attack surfaces. For policymakers, the heightened insecurity 
created by the rapid expansion of the IoT marks a significant governance challenge. 
Addressing these security deficiencies will require an increase in the capacity to share threat 
information as well as a range of innovative technical and policy solutions. The workshop 
marked a starting point in building a global community of security practitioners and 
policymakers who are interested in these issues and who are working on similar topics.  
Given the scope and nature of the problem outlined above, the ambition of this workshop 
was not to explore possible remedies to the cyber security of the IoT. Rather, our intention 
was to facilitate a conversation about a changed way of working through these problems. We 
all understand that close engagement between the policy community and the technical 
community is essential to address cyber security challenges at a domestic or global level. And 
we also recognise that communication between these groups is frequently lacking – even 
when they are around the same table.  We wanted to better understand why this is and what 
steps we might take to improve it.  
To achieve this, we wanted to work with three groups of people in a pilot facilitated 
environment. We invited people who work in domestic or global cyber security policy 
communities. We also invited a group of people from the technical community who we knew 
already have an interest in and appetite for policy issues. Finally, we included some 
academics, especially early career academics who we expect will go on to play a role in these 
debates over coming decades. The workshop was organised around keynotes with associated 
break-out sessions. The first half of the day threw us into the communication challenge by 
asking participants to work on a specific problem that is currently being widely debated in 
both communities – the potential for introducing a certification or labelling scheme for IoT 
devices. The second half of the day was spent discussing innovation in governance 
arrangements with an eye to blue sky thinking that was not constrained by existing 
mechanisms. We wanted to know from these people, if the technical and policy communities 
could work together more effectively, what would be needed?  
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Apostolos Malatras from ENISA and Nick Davis from the World Economic Forum gave the two 
thought provoking keynote presentations. Irina Brass and Leonie Tanczer (both from PETRAS) 
designed and facilitated the two break-out sessions. Predefined questions and scenarios 
guided the conversation and were used to incentivise a debate amongst workshop 
participants. We are extremely grateful to them and to all the participants who played a role 
in this day. We anticipate that it is the first of many such engagements that will be necessary 
to move forward global policy approaches to the cyber security of the IoT 
This report summarises the keynote presentations and the discussions that took place during 
the break-out sessions. We are grateful to Feja Lesniewska, a PETRAS research associate at 
STEaPP, for collating the workshop materials to write this report. 
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Workshop Background and Rationale  
After a brief welcome address to the workshop by Professor Jeremy Watson CBE, Director of 
the PETRAS IoT Research Hub, (STEaPP, UCL) the background and rationale to the workshop 
was provided by Dr Madeline Carr (STEaPP, UCL) 
Jeremy Watson CBE FREng FIET FICE DPhil is Professor of Engineering 
Systems at UCL STEaPP. He also has responsibility, as Vice-Dean of 
Engineering Sciences, for the engineering mission at UCL. Jeremy is a 
Chartered Engineer, a Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering, a 
Fellow of the Institution of Civil Engineers and the Institution of 
Engineering and Technology.  
 
Dr Madeline Carr is an Associate Professor of International Relations 
and Cyber Security at UCL STEaPP. She is also the Co-Investigator of the 
Standards, Policy and Governance Stream of PETRAS. She is the Director 
of the UCL Digital Policy Lab and Director of the Research Institute for 
Science of Cyber Security (RISCS) which focuses on human and 
organisational factors in cyber security.  
   
Alongside widespread optimism about the huge potential for the Internet of Things (IoT) to 
deliver a wide range of social and economic benefits, the significant security vulnerabilities 
are widely recognised. IoT security issues have far-reaching implications for deeply held 
values of privacy, autonomy, democracy, equity and order. There is a clear understanding 
that if IoT technology threatens core values, people will be less inclined to adopt it. Given that 
the implementation of IoT systems relies upon widespread participation and take up, getting 
security right is fundamental to fully realizing the potential benefits.  
Significantly for those of us attending this workshop, the IoT is not simply a domestic issue. 
It is a global coordination challenge and while all states will develop their approach to this 
technology in ways that best address their own national interest, they will do so within a 
global, interoperable and interdependent ecosystem of complex supply chains, data flows, 
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services and infrastructure. Many of the governance challenges that we have been facing for 
the past two decades of digital technology (like jurisdiction, for example) will be exacerbated 
as we rethink the ownership of personal data collected via the IoT.  
The IoT will stretch (perhaps to breaking point in some cases) the structures and mechanisms 
for governing technology that have endured until now. The IoT will also require changes to 
the allocation of liability and responsibility. Understanding what these changes should to be 
in the context of the IoT is important to developing effective governance. Once a million 
internet enabled lightbulbs, installed in buildings all over the world, are found to be 
vulnerable, thereby potentially opening up millions of gateways to sometimes critical 
networks, questions arise about who will be responsible for removing or replacing them – 
especially once the manufacturer has gone bankrupt. How will product liability (which is how 
we currently think about vehicles) have any meaning when a family car relies on Internet 
delivered services, data flows and networked infrastructure to operate safely? The standards, 
governance and policy implications of this complexity for international trade, for global 
security and for global governance are significant. Given the rapid rate at which the IoT is 
being implemented around the world, the technical community and policymakers need to 
prioritise thinking them through. 
Yet, despite the clear need for action, international policy coordination on emerging 
technologies has not progressed. At key fora where these negotiations take place, the focus 
continues to remain firmly fixed on the cyber security problems of the last few decades. The 
challenges faced in the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in 2017, competition and 
conflict within the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the uncertain role and 
future of the UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF) all exemplify the way that politics can get 
in the way of innovation and technological progress. Yet, at the heart of these forums and 
negotiations are people who understand the issues and care about them. Despite recognition 
from some of them that the cyber security of the IoT is an immediate problem which demands 
rapid, global coordination, there seems limited capacity to incorporate or introduce emerging 
challenges. This applies to the IoT, which is already rolling out. It does not bode well for our 
capacity to incorporate those challenges that we know will develop further down the track – 
like Artificial Intelligence (AI).  
In examining this issue, it would seem that there are two truths which are not entirely 
compatible. The first truth is that the technical community has been remarkably successful 
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at coordinating the build out and interoperability of a global network over the past 25 years. 
It is too easy to take this for granted and to simply accept that Internet technologies work. 
Through innovative governance mechanisms, people all over the world have developed, 
maintained and secured the domain name system. They have resolved differences when they 
arise and they have addressed challenges to the legitimacy of those governance mechanisms 
– adapting and responding to change in an effective and efficient way. So this is the first truth 
– we’ve seen agility, innovation and successful coordination in the governance of technology 
from the technical community that has not yet been replicated in the global policy 
community. 
The second truth is that technology is political. Technology is the domain of politics because 
technology inevitably develops in ways that privilege some and disadvantage others. 
Technological innovation has economic implications. It has implications for important 
democratic institutions like elections and a rigorous free press which underpin our social 
structures. Technology impacts on deeply personal factors like privacy, the management of 
our own identities, access to knowledge and others’ access to information about us. 
Technology shapes the economy and it impacts how the law is applied and upheld. It shapes 
international law – humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict. These are deeply political 
considerations and they cannot be left to the technical community, to the private sector or 
to the amorphous and indistinct communities that we refer to as ‘NGOs’ and ‘civil society’.  
One of the key challenges of our time then, is to narrow the gap between these two truths – 
to bring the discourse and practices of the technical communities and the global policymaking 
communities into much closer contact to create a shared knowledge space.  
To conclude I want to share an experience I had at the 2017 UN IGF, that highlighted the gap 
that exists between the technical and the policymaking communities. The SGP team were 
presenting on the role of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) in 
international cyber norms negotiations and were confronted with the reality that most of the 
CSIRT community is completely unaware of the fact that they feature in international 
agreements about responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. Also, in a major push by 
Microsoft, there were what seemed like a dozen panels on their Digital Geneva Convention 
proposal. I went to many of these panels but one of them clashed with a session on emerging 
identifiers and Digital Object Architecture that I wanted to see. As I was sitting in this large 
auditorium listening to internet engineers talking about the development and 
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implementation of changes that would profoundly affect the way the Internet works, with all 
kinds of interesting implications, it occurred to me that the people who were upstairs talking 
about the ‘politics of the Internet’ really needed to be in this room. And vice versa. Even 
though we had all travelled to Geneva to attend the same meeting in the same venue, the 
political and technical communities were, for all intents and purposes, at two different events. 
Many people in the technical community have an appetite for and appreciation of policy 
problems. Similarly, plenty of policymakers think creatively and innovatively about alternative 
approaches to governing technology. Some of you are here today and others will join us at 
future meetings of this working group. I want to suggest today that developing a community 
of people like us – who have expertise in one area but a real interest and willingness to engage 
in others – developing that community holds as much potential for positive change as any 
governance mechanism or institution. Without doubt policymakers would benefit from more 
technical literacy. But the technical community would also benefit from having a better 
understanding of policy processes, as well as the pressures, constraints and influences that 
policymakers face so that it may become less mystifying why they sometimes reject or ignore 
sound technical advice.  
At this workshop, we are initiating a project that specifically seeks to understand why 
communication between the technical and policy community on international issues 
frequently fails. In doing so we will gain insights into how the policy community needs 
information packaged and presented and why the technical community may not always 
provide information in this way. Understanding this information and communication gap is 
an essential step in helping us move beyond it. By the policy community making it clear what 
they need to help them make more informed decisions, the technical community may 
become more effective at providing advice that could be implemented more readily. 
To this end, the workshop focuses on a particular issue – certification and labelling schemes 
– not to debate whether these are a good or bad idea – but simply as a mechanism to help us 
think through communication between the communities in a concrete context.  We will 
creatively reflect on the future (or possible futures) of the global governance of technology – 
specifically prompted by the emerging challenges of the cybersecurity of the IoT.  
The agenda for this initial meeting is structured around two focal points; first, the work on 
IoT cyber security produced by ENISA and second, the thought leadership of the World 
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Economic Forum on the Fourth Industrial Revolution. At the end of the workshop, ideas about 
the next steps necessary for continuing this dialogue and creating a community of researchers 
and practitioners are to be collected. Ideally, I would like to reconvene next year to reach a 
broader group of technical/policy/academic and industry colleagues also willing to engage in 
integrating emerging cyber security challenges into international policy discourse.  
 
Dr Madeline Carr 
Associate Professor of International Relations and Cyber Security 
PETRAS and STEaPP, UCL 
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Bridging the Communication Divide: One Issue - Two Approaches 
In this first session, Dr Apostolos Malatras set the scene with his keynote presentation on 
ENISA’s initiative to achieve improved IoT cybersecurity in Europe. He highlighted both the 
technical and policy challenges that are commonly identified in discussions on IoT and 
cybersecurity but he also underscored the extensive need for open, effective dialogue 
between the two communities. An ongoing failure to prioritise building this cross-community 
understanding and dialogue undermines interventions designed to address problems. It is 
integral to the successful upscaling of IoT systems that knowledge and information are 
effectively articulated across the communities.  
The follow up break-out session designed and facilitated by Dr Irina Brass aimed to help 
participants understand how differently the technical and policy communities can perceive 
and articulate IoT issues. Dr Brass presented a real-world policy challenge so that participants 
could discuss in groups and identify the communication obstacles that occur between the 
communities in a simulated environment. Participants were asked to discuss certification and 
labelling schemes for the IoT. The break-out session helped bring into focus and make more 
explicit the communication challenges between the technical and policymaking communities 
that Dr Malastras had discussed in his opening keynote as had Dr Carr in her introductory 
presentation.  
These communication challenges are immense given the parallel universes each community 
has operated in for many years. Yet the IoT and other emerging technologies are forcing the 
technical and policymaking communities together to address new problems. Investment is 
urgently needed to build the collective capacity to communicate and create solutions for the 
future IoT landscape to be sustainable at a global scale.   
Fostering IoT Cybersecurity in Europe and the Communication Challenges 
Keynote Speaker: Dr Apostolos Malatras, Network and Information 
Security Expert at European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA). Apostolos has worked for many years 
in the industry (Thales Research & Technology, Ltd. UK) and 
academia (University of Fribourg, Switzerland). For the last three 
years, he has been working for the European Commission. He 
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received a BSc in Computer Science from the University of Piraeus, Greece, a M.Sc. degree in 
Information Systems from the Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece, and a 
Ph.D. degree in Networking from the University of Surrey. He is the author and co-author of 
more than 60 research papers and scientific reports.  
Background 
ENISA is a centre of expertise for cyber security in Europe. It was established in 2004 and is 
located in Greece. Its mission is to build capacity through hands-on activities including 
training, developing expertise, issuing recommendations and independent advice, and finally, 
contributing to policy development by supporting Member States and the European 
Commission with a view to fostering harmonisation across the EU. It is actively contributing 
to the network and information security (NIS) within the Union, to the development of a 
culture of NIS in society and to raising awareness of NIS issues. 
ENISA works closely together with Member States and the private sector to deliver advice and 
solutions. This includes, the pan-European Cyber Security Exercises, the development of 
National Cyber Security Strategies, Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRTs), and 
cooperation and capacity building measures. It also includes addressing data protection 
issues, trust services, privacy enhancing technologies and privacy on emerging technologies, 
as well as identifying the cyber threat landscape.1 
The IoT – New Opportunities and Threats 
Europe faces new challenges with the IoT. ENISA defines the IoT as “a cyber-physical 
ecosystem of interconnected sensors and actuators, which enable intelligent decision 
making”.2 Stemming from the definition is the fact that information lies at the heart of the 
IoT, feeding into a continuous cycle of sensing, decision-making, and actions. The IoT becomes 
an enabler of Smart Infrastructures, such as Industry 4.0, smart grids, and smart transport by 
enabling services of higher quality and facilitating the provision of advanced functionalities. 
The original business case driving the IoT was to transform critical infrastructure into smart 
infrastructures. The resulting paradigm shift could lead to increased productivity, reduced 
                                                        
 
1 Further information on ENISA available - https://www.enisa.europa.eu/about-enisa  
2 ENISA, IoT and Smart Infrastructures - https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/iot-and-smart-infrastructures/iot  
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costs through integration and novel value-added services increasing economic growth. Yet 
the widespread adoption of the IoT brings with it multiple cybersecurity risks due to the 
following challenges: 
§ An increased attack surface 
§ New problems with interoperability 
§ Lack of expertise and a lack of incentives for security 
§ Security by design is not supported by market drivers 
§ Problems with applying updates to some very simple but critical devices 
§ Insecure development continuing to build in insecurity 
§ Unclear lines of liability 
§ Ongoing fragmentation of good practices and standards (experiments) 
Securing the IoT  
Ensuring the security of the IoT is both application and context-specific. A nuclear power plant 
is going to need a different approach to achieve security than the IoT system that controls 
autonomous vehicles or children’s toys for instance. By taking a sectoral approach, it is 
possible to begin to understand the threats for each sector and the use of the IoT in that 
sector. Good practices identified in one sector may be advantageously replicated in another 
sector. Building sector specific expert groups can help to embed good practice and enhance 
cyber security in each sector. But of course, IoT devices are often mobile and it is therefore 
important to ensure that devices are still secure when they move from one sector to another. 
There are also issues within some sectors of legacy systems using older software that will vary 
depending on individual cases. Given this, communication across sectors is a key component 
in developing a resilient IoT based smart economy and society. Although the IoT is not 
covered by the EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS), it can be found within 
all sectors covered by the NIS so policymakers should not be ignoring it.3 
To move ahead and promote the ENISA Baseline IoT Security Recommendations it will be 
necessary to: 
                                                        
 
3 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016  
concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 194/1, 19.7.2016 available https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016L1148&from=EN   
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§ Harmonise IoT security initiatives and regulations;  
§ Reach consensus on interoperability across the IoT ecosystem;  
§ Promote economic and administrative incentives for IoT security; 
§ Secure both software and hardware development lifecycles; 
§ Adopt circular IoT product/service lifecycle management; and,  
§ Clarify liability for IoT systems.  
All of these will require extensive engagement between the technical and policymaking 
communities. At this current time, there is a scarcity of people in each community who can 
effectively understand and articulate the necessary knowledge and information to a broad 
range of stakeholders involved in regulation and governance. Building a community of experts 
is integral to achieving effective solutions presented by the IoT for all stakeholders. 
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Table 1: ENISA Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT (2017) 
Policy and Organizational Approaches 
§ Security by design 
§ Privacy by design 
§ Asset management 
§ Risk and threat identification  
People and Processes  
§ End-of-life support 
§ Proven solutions 
§ Management of security vulnerabilities and/or incidents  
§ Human resources security training and awareness 
§ Third-party relationships 
 
Technical Issues 
§ Hardware security                                          
§ Trust and integrity management 
§ Strong default security and privacy           
§ Data protection and compliance 
§ System safety and reliability                         
§ Secure software/firmware updates 
§ Authentications 
§ Authorization 
§ Cryptography                                                     
§ Secure and trusted communications 
§ Secure interfaces and network services     
§ Secure input and output handling   
§ Monitoring and auditing 




   
   
 
There remain many open questions regarding IoT security. It is clear there are divergent 
views on what IoT security entails; this can depend on the level of abstraction adopted. 
Although a sector and context specific approach is often envisaged, there remains discussion 
of whether there should be an entire IoT ecosystem solution to address security issues – and 
whether this is realistic or necessary. Regardless of the approach, there needs to be 
agreement on what benchmarks to apply for IoT security efforts. Discussions on all of these 
issues continue to take place in different fora amongst different communities of actors. It is 
important that shared knowledge spaces are created to improve communication and improve 
understanding of these problems from all sides.  
The next session creates a simulated space in which technical experts and policymakers focus 
on the open questions and knowledge exchange surrounding certification and labelling of IoT. 
While this is actually a question that ENISA and others are deeply engaged in, the purpose 
here is not to try to resolve whether performance-based or process-based criteria should be 
used in certification or labelling schemes. Rather, the focus here will be how well can we 
articulate respective positions on this issue across the techno-policy divide in such a way that 
counter-parts can understand? 
Break-Out Session: Certification and Labelling 
Facilitator Dr Irina Brass is Lecturer in Regulation, Innovation and Public 
Policy at UCL STEaPP. She is the Co-Investigator of the PETRAS Standards, 
Governance and Policy Stream. She is also the Chair of the IoT-1 
Technical Committee of the British Standards Institution (BSI) – the 
national standards body of the UK. Dr Brass holds a PhD in Government 
from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).  
Problem Identification 
As the keynote presentation illustrated, knowledge and expertise in the technical and 
operational community frequently fails to be conveyed effectively to support policy-makers 
in developing goals and objectives to overcome economic, social and environmental 
challenges associated with technology. This can have costly consequences for citizens, 
governments and businesses alike. To alter this situation, it is vital that the policymaking and 
technical communities can more effectively and productively communicate.  
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A salient example where communication is fundamental between the technical community 
and policymakers in order to generate effective outcomes is certification and labelling 
schemes for the IoT. Certification and labelling for IoT is often perceived as potentially 
advantageous for both users and manufacturers as a means to enhance users' trust in IoT. 
The recently proposed EU cybersecurity certification framework is a first attempt to explore 
compliance of specified requirements.4 This may form the basis for future discussions on a 
range of issues including the measurability of cybersecurity, the consistency and equivalence 
of evaluation methods, benchmarking as well as the enforceability of certificates across the 
entire lifecycle of IoT products and services. However, certification and labelling of IoT devices 
is contentious for a number of reasons including: a) that cybersecurity is more dynamic than 
product safety; b) the boundaries between physical security, cyber security, data integrity, 
data protection and product safety become increasingly blurred with emerging technologies 
such as the IoT; c) there is currently no consensus on whether the best way to standardise IoT 
is through a horizontal baseline of minimum requirements upon which to devise an 
overarching certification scheme, or whether this should happen in verticals. This contention 
makes it a perfect issue around which to structure our facilitated conversation in which 
different perspectives must be communicated with clarity and with an understanding of both 
technical and policy implications. 
Method: 
This break out session was designed to foster discussions between the technical and 
policymaking communities to understand how each perceived of, and communicated about, 
“what is known” and “what is not known” about the IoT vulnerabilities and risks that an IoT 
security certification schemes would address. The participants were divided into small groups 
                                                        
 
4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, the "EU Cybersecurity 
Agency", and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology 
Cybersecurity Certification (''Cybersecurity Act''), Brussels, 13.9.2017 COM (2017) 477 final  




   
   
 
to collectively answer two questions. Following on, there was a feedback session for all 
participants to share their responses.   
Thus, the aim of the session was not to discuss whether IoT certification is “good” or “bad” – 
a common direction that a lot of debates around cybersecurity certification and labelling 
schemes tend to take. Instead, the aim of the session was to facilitate discussion on: 
How do we communicate technical and operational expertise 
for policy-makers to make informed decisions about 
certification and labelling? 
The participants were invited to work in small groups to address two questions that would 
help identify any gaps in the knowledge exchange between the technical and the policy 
community on this issue.  
Question 1: What critical evidence is needed in order to establish, measure, and assess the 
kind of IoT cyber security risks that could be addressed by certification and labelling 
initiatives?  
1. Measuring IoT threats / vulnerabilities and categorising risks 
One of the main challenges that the participants identified is the issue of measuring threats 
and vulnerabilities in IoT, and the wider economic, social and environmental risks that these 
might trigger. Although there are several information security processes, practices and 
standards already in place, the question is whether they are fully adequate for the IoT, which 
embeds day-to-day physical products with connectivity to the Internet and its global 
infrastructure, while delivering new digital services. Several groups acknowledged that the 
technical community has information about bad traffic and potentially compromised points 
on their network, the problem is what actually should we measure: e.g. do we measure the 
number of external points in a network and use existing indicators? Or do we measure their 
impact on the integrity of the network. Ultimately, the participants concluded that in order 
to fully understand IoT threats and vulnerabilities, one needs to move away from the issue of 
“measurement” to understanding the “characterising structure”. This stems from the reality 
that IoT vulnerabilities, threats, and subsequent risks, are context dependent.   
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Another approach to uncovering low hanging IoT security vulnerabilities is to use the “story 
telling” methodology. Some participants indicated that this methodology was used to inform 
the DCMS “Principles for IoT Security by Design”, where technical, industry and policy experts 
came together to identify the main IoT security vulnerabilities reported in the media about 
recent IoT security breaches and their risks for consumers (e.g. Kayla doll; default passwords 
and the Mirai DDoS attack).      
2. What is being certified? The device, the system, or the process? 
The participants were quick to acknowledge common challenges on the IoT and certification 
that span the technical and policy communities: What do we measure? Is it the device, the 
system or the organisational process? In addition, the participants noted that understanding 
the boundaries of the system in which several connected devices operate is crucial for 
deciding upon the evidence needed to inform a certification scheme. In this case, we need to 
know the boundaries of the system and the governing rules: what is the relationship between 
these devices within the system and what are the risks of inserting a new element, especially 
as one of the key characteristics of the IoT is its mobility, which may confound the character 
of those boundaries?  
Some participants used the example of the Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) to 
exemplify the potential gaps between system design, system boundaries (i.e. technical 
aspects) and the rules that govern those systems (i.e. rules, regulations, policy). In the case of 
CAVs, the system boundaries for the vehicle itself may be bound, but that system interacts 
with several others (e.g. smart grid), so technically we need to understand the structure of 
the system-of-systems at large. But we also need to be aware of the rules, regulations and 
policies that govern those different systems and the different jurisdictional boundaries. Are 
there common principles that the technical and policy communities are working towards? 
This is the current technical – policy gap that IoT exposes and exacerbates.  
3. IoT in context  
A final issue that the participants emphasised is that knowledge about the context in which 
IoT operates represents a clear gap if a certification scheme is to be promoted. It was 
highlighted that the technical and policy community need to work together more closely to 
understand how different classes of devices play in a particular context (i.e. a technical 
matter) and the existing rules that govern those contexts (i.e. a policy issue). For instance, 
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one participant proposed that mapping these contexts to conventional safety regulations, 
data protection rules or building standards could be a starting point to understand what rules 
apply in given contexts that might enable or disable cyber security vulnerabilities.  
Representatives of the technical community also highlighted the importance of understanding 
IoT use cases, i.e. how IoT is actually used in a particular context. Once again, this is a gap in 
knowledge that needs evidence and co-design between the technical and policy community. 
A technical expert asked: “One can only design a comprehensive certification scheme when 
understanding all the potential uses and misuses of IoT, and how it behaves in diverse 
environments. How can we then design certification schemes that reflect IoT uses 
across multiple contexts, from consumer to industrial IoT?” Once again, CAVs were used as an 
example. Vehicles have multiple uses: busses, taxis, private use, etc. Understanding, 
identifying and clarifying these different interactions with IoT are essential for designing 
comprehensive standards and certifications schemes. 
Lastly, the participants noted that there has been an assumption in both the technical and 
the policy communities that there is an alignment between “user” and “intended use”, and 
that the IoT challenges this premise in a way that makes it imperative for these two 
communities to come together, understand their knowledge base and align technical design 
with policy interventions.  
Concluding Remarks for Question 1: 
For an IoT security certification scheme to be successful, we need to be clear from the outset 
what exactly is being certified. Is it a device, a part of a device, or a system? To design 
certification systems, it is necessary to determine which risks are critical, what evidence to 
use, which criteria are to be used to measure and assess the risks, and how best to derive and 
categorise evidence and knowledge from different contexts in which IoT operates. 
Key questions that need to be asked include: 
• What is the nature of the object? 
• What does the object want to do? 
• What is the context in which it operates and the system boundaries? 
• Can these interactions be categorised? 
• What are the risks that emerge when objects and contexts are mixed up?  
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• What are the acceptable mixes? 
• What should not be happening either to the function of the object or the requirements 
of the object? 
 
In terms of future steps, technical and policy experts in the room agreed that more common 
ground needs to be achieved on the following issues:  
i) Critical evidence 
§ People/types/categories - critical evidence is diverse and context dependent for 
example it can come from children, vulnerable people, critical infrastructure.  
§ Users - pay no attention to ‘evidence’, especially consumers of domestic IoT. 
§ ‘Stories’ and ‘narratives’ are better mediums to communicate the threats from 
IoT cyber vulnerabilities, for example the ‘spying on children’ teddy bear case. 
ii) Measures and assessment 
§ Dialogue is crucial across sectors to help understand different priorities amongst 
vested interests – industry (small medium sized enterprises), consumer groups, 
and government departments. 
§ Quick fixes do not work because they cause conflicts within a complex governance 
landscape often resulting in problems further down the line. 
§ Working outside sector silos is important – it helps to prevent a stovepipe 
mentality when designing measures and assessments.  
iii) Security risks 
§ Security definitions depend on the advisory body – individual, group, state 
(public/private) and scale (for example home vs critical infrastructure) that is 
being targeted. 
§ The type and target of security threats varies significantly. 
§ A story board approach - ‘how did we get here?’ - can help to develop greater 
understanding across different communities.  
§ Scale, and how this is linked to the degree of security threat, needs to be 
considered when developing design measures. 
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iv) Certification and labelling initiatives design 
§ Always find the middle way – with interoperability for instance. 
§ Informed consensus should be used to agree procedures. 
§ Power dynamics between different representatives – and how this affects the 
process in developing and agreeing policy – needs to be understood. 
§ Capacity building within all sectors is necessary to understand the threats, risks 
and security dimensions so policy approaches can be fully informed. 
 
Question 2: What kind of research is needed to support informed policy decision-making 
about domestic and/or regional initiatives such as the EC Cybersecurity Certification 
Framework?  
This question was designed to take the findings and learning from Question 1 in order to 
identify directions that would inform future socio-technical research on IoT security and trust. 
In particular, participants were asked to focus their answers on:  
 
• Communicating technical “known-knowns” (i.e. technical issues policy makers are 
aware of and understand). 
• Understand policy “known-unknowns” (i.e. technical issues policy makers are aware 
of but might not fully understand). 
 
The participants identified the following research areas that require a closer alignment 
between technical and social scientific experimentation and understanding.  
1. The security checklist approach   
One of the key areas that requires further socio-technical research is whether the checklist 
approach that is recommended by voluntary standardisation bodies such as the IoT Security 
Foundation, is useful, efficient and sufficient to mitigate IoT cyber security threats and risks.  
 
Some policy and technical experts in the room highlighted that a checklist is useful to expose 
known, low hanging security vulnerabilities such as default passwords or the need to ensure 
that software is updated throughout the lifecycle of an Internet connected consumer product. 
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As long as this is explained in clear ways, it could drive the market to eliminate known 
cybersecurity security risks. 
 
However, technical experts in the room highlighted that this is problematic for cyber security 
in general, and IoT cyber security in particular, because in the IT industry security is a process, 
not a state. How would we then know if the checklist is up to date? How often should these 
standardisation organisations update it and how quickly should they disseminate it to the 
wider audience?  
 
In addition, technical experts noted that if both technical and policy communities start 
thinking of security as a cycle, then they can jointly map out the evidence needed as part of a 
techno-social feedback loop. They emphasised that this approach, which departs from a rigid 
design of a checklist, has been successfully used in the airline industry, spotting near misses 
and incorporating that evidence into business and organisational learning processes. The 
airline industry has collectively recognised that this information is actually valuable business 
intelligence. The sector as a whole can benefit from that information being shared. 
 
• What is known now (e.g. default passwords, policy coverage?) 
• What is not known now (e.g. is the checklist up to date?) 
• Does the checklist have an ongoing feedback loop making it more dynamic? 
 
2. Consumer behaviour  
Consumer behaviour is another area that the participants identified as crucial for more socio-
technical research. Given IoT security is ultimately contextual (see Question 1), technical 
participants highlighted that we don’t have enough knowledge of what happens when we 
interconnect devices in environments that have particular specifications or when the 
anticipated use case may change. This is why a systematic scenario methodology into 
understanding consumer behaviour and use cases is required. Technical experts showcased 
this with an example from sharing datasets: we know the risks or privacy challenges of a 
particular data set, but when we start correlating, we see new risks that emerge. The same 
issue applies to IoT security: it is not enough to know what happens in a particular system 
that has predefined boundaries; more work needs to be done in order to understand what 
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happens when we start interconnecting systems and the datasets they rely upon to automate 
certain processes.   
 
Social scientists in the room pointed out that behavioural literature is producing very 
interesting findings on how consumers become informed about uses and share information - 
findings that the technical community could make more use of (e.g. cyber hygiene).   
 
In terms of consumer behaviour, the experts noted that we are already seeing trends whereby 
consumers want their devices to be intelligent, smart, capable of, but not necessarily, being 
connected to third parties. More research needs to be done in understanding these trends, 
and the balance between functionality – connectivity – data protection – security.  
 
• What will happen when we interconnect things - anticipated use cases may change.   
• Scenarios methodology – understanding the cascade effects of these systems.   
• Know what the risk or privacy challenges of a particular data set when start 
correlating, understand new risks. 
• Understanding users’ needs and expectations when designing interventions like 
labelling/certification.   
• Not only what are the systems, but what happens when start interconnecting 
these systems/data sets.   
3. Internet protocol developers 
Another area that requires further research is whether Internet protocol developers and 
users are considering how IoT devices are communicating. Technical experts in the room 
noted that there is a clear link between the protocol and the performance of a device. 
Developers are mostly concerned with how to make the best protocol for their devices. A key 
driver for developing proprietary protocols is so a manufacturer can benefit commercially not 
just from sales of the device, but from the brand lock-in associated with having their own 
protocol, and perhaps from the intellectual property rights if their protocol goes mainstream. 
Whatever the driver, they should equally consider the interoperability level, especially how 
devices understand each other.  
• Protocol developers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) need to think more about 
how IoT devices are communicating.  
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4. Economics and externalities  
A final area that both policy and technical experts identified as crucial for further research is 
the economic – business question. The experts agreed that more research needs to be done 
in understanding the implications of IoT (in)security on business models, organisation 
processes and products/ services.  
 
Technical experts in the room noted that if we just look at the issue of securing the Internet, 
or the IoT device, we haven’t secured the core of the system. Ultimately, IoT is increasingly 
becoming a service, and, this leads not only to new business models, but also raises new 
concerns for how businesses understand and implement ‘good’ cyber security practices 
throughout the system.  
 
Policy experts in the room also highlighted that the lack of IoT cyber security has externalities 
that go beyond organisational boundaries, that are systemic at national and international 
level, and that need to be addressed and understood at this systemic level.  
 
In addition, it was highlighted that the economic nature of our interactions is changing 
because of the IoT, information flows differently, it is not just devices that are low cost, it is 
also the transport of information that comes with new risks.  
 
    
• Big known unknown is the economic question – the complexity is little understood.   
• The economic nature of our interactions is changing because of IoT, not just the 
devices that are low cost, but it is the transport of information that also comes 
with risks.   
• Need to understand the externalities to the IoT: economic, social and 
environmental.   
Informed policy decision-making requires quality research. Researchers need to understand 
what research will deliver effective outcomes for targeted policymakers. The situation for 
researchers will be challenged by new risks that emerge as things become increasingly 
interconnected. This will change the research and policy landscape, potentially causing 
cascade effects within and between systems/data sets that were previously unconsidered or 
even unknown. 
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Researchers need to identify what are the questions that need to be answered. There is also 
a need for researchers to understand which research methodologies should be applied to 
deliver the relevant outcomes. Outcomes similarly need to be delivered in output formats 
that communicate effectively with targeted policymakers. Researchers need to develop 
innovative communication strategies to increase their impact. 
Part two of the session highlighted the breadth of the research agenda that needs to be 
addressed to deliver a safe, secure and reliable IoT. Key to meeting the research needs 
effectively will be developing a community of both technological experts and policymakers 
who achieve a common understanding and approach to communicating problems and 
solutions.   
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Session Two: New Approaches to Governance in the 21st Century 
In the second session, Nicholas Davis from the World Economic Forum (WEF) set the scene 
by outlining the ways in which conventional governance instruments and mechanisms are 
running up against their limits in the face of the demands introduced by rapidly emerging 
technologies. Nick introduced some of the World Economic Forum’s work on the concept of 
the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR) and how ‘agile governance’ may offer a more adaptive and 
flexible approach than traditional processes and practices, many which were designed to 
address problems in a pre-digital era. Nick highlighted the lessons that WEF drew on from 
software developers when designing the concept ‘agile governance’. Agile governance, 
although considered a ‘work in progress’ by the WEF, it is a living example of the cross-
community knowledge sharing outlined by Madeline Carr in her opening address to the 
workshop. Borrowing governance approaches from the technical community may open up 
pathways for innovative governance design that meets the needs of a new era. 
Dr Leonie Tanczer, followed up Nick’s presentation with a break-out session designed to 
proactively explore areas for collaboration and synergy between the technical and the policy 
community. The exercise aimed to foster a creative environment in which representatives 
from the technical and policymaking communities could generate novel ideas for governance 
in the 4IR. 
The session highlighted the potential that exists when the space is created to engage in cross-
community dialogue. This valuable snap shot illustrated the opportunities that can be 
capitalised on if more investment is made to build and foster the relationships between the 
technical and policymaking communities to address the myriad of pressing challenges of IoT 
governance.   
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Can Global Governance Be Agile? 
Keynote Speaker: Nicholas Davis, Head of Society and Innovation, 
Member of the Executive Committee, World Economic Forum, Geneva. 
Nicholas has Bachelor of Laws (Hons), University of Sydney; and MBA 
(Hons), University of Oxford. Between 2001-03, he was a Commercial 
Lawyer at Windeyer Dibbs Lawyers. He was admitted to the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales as Solicitor and Barrister.  
 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) was established in 1971 as a not-for-profit foundation in 
Geneva, Switzerland.5 The forum engages the foremost political, business and other leaders 
of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas. In 2016, the WEF’s “Shaping the 
Future of Digital Economy and Society System Initiative” was established to ensure the digital 
future is inclusive, trustworthy and sustainable too. The Internet of Things (IoT) is a key focus. 
Looking beyond the IoT's economic impact, the WEF is researching its effect on society and 
on the UN's sustainable development goals (SDGs). Most current IoT projects can contribute 
to achieving both the SDGs and the UN’s 2030 mission. Indeed, 84% of existing IoT 
deployments can address the SDGs.6 To benefit from the IoT, governance will need to adapt. 
The WEF is proposing that a more agile governance approach is needed to address the 
complex new challenges presented in the 21st century to co-create solutions.  
Innovative technological capabilities are being enabled by digital infrastructure, not just 
digital applications, that offer new economic, social and environmental opportunities. These 
include: 
§ Extending digital technologies (IoT, new computing, blockchain). 
                                                        
 
5 White Paper on Agile Governance: Reimagining Policymaking for the Fourth Industrial Revolution (January 
2018); K. Schwab and N. Davis, Shaping the Fourth Industrial Revolution, World Economic Forum (2018) 




   
   
 
§ Reforming the physical world (Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics, 3D printing, 
advanced materials, drones). 
§ Altering the human being (biotech, neurotech, Virtual Reality (VR) /Augmented Reality 
(AR)). 
§ Integrating the environment (geoengineering, energy capture and storage, space 
resource extraction). 
These emerging industrial technologies are challenging existing governance tools that were 
designed in a different era. As Madeleine K. Albright insightfully observed "People are talking 
to governments on 21st century technology, the government hears them on 20th century 
technology, and responds with 19th century ideas." The implications for global governance 
will be potentially catastrophic if new innovative and more effective tools are not developed 
and deployed soon.  
Governance processes need to be designed with the following three assumptions in mind: 
• Technology is political: The political nature of advanced technologies requires close 
attention and governance because we are building economies, societies and world 
views through them. In turn, they shape how we interpret the world and the 
possibilities we envision. Agile governance can proactively help shape and direct how 
technologies impact people and communities in a malleable way through an iterative 
process.  
• Decisions taken today matter: As 4IR technologies mature, it is important that we 
make considered decisions now and take action if we are to shape the configuration 
and impact of technologically driven systems for a shared, common objective.  
• Empowering people at all levels: Positioning values that promote societal benefit and 
well-being as priorities for governance can direct the development and use of 
emerging technologies and who they benefit. Existing governance tools are unable to 
address the challenges that the 4IR presents as technologies from different disciplines 
have their interoperability and combinatory capacities supported by increasing 
computing power, bandwidth, and machine learning algorithms.  
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Shifting Governance: From Traditional to Agile  
Traditional governance is distinct in that it is periodic, moving from the general to the specific, 
using incentives to create effects, employing targets, monitoring activities and outcomes 
(usually top-down), applying sanctions or fines where compliance is breached.  
The governance tools used for traditional governance include international conventions and 
agreements (the Montreal Protocol, Cartagena Protocol and the Paris Agreement) usually led 
by governments but also sometimes by non-state actors like international organisations 
(WTO, WIPO), non-state led influencers (ISO, certification), powerful sub-national leadership 
(California emissions trading standards), hybrid groups (ICANN), and investor influences (Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation). Common problems associated with these traditional tools 
are: 
• These instruments can take a long time to sign and ratify, 
• They face enforcement problems, 
• They can be difficult to update, 
• Agreements can be highly challenging when interests diverge, 
• They can also be highly challenging when the subject is technical and uncertain. 
An alternative model to the traditional approach is agile governance which blends intrinsic 
and extrinsic approaches. By doing so, more often than not, this governance approach will 
create a better dynamic between the general and specific. It does set limits, but these are 
more on outcomes than a specific activity. Also, agile governance will create effective, 
relevant incentives that are linked to the bigger picture e.g. sustainability. Monitoring of 
activities and outcomes will come from the bottom-up rather than the top-down. This will 
use automatic / pre-triggered mechanisms. This dynamic approach is apparent in the 
principles that have informed agile governance conceptual development.  
Agile governance draws on principles developed in the technical community found in Agile 
Software Development:  
• Outcomes over rules 
• Responding over following a plan 
• Participation over control 
• Self-organization over centralization 
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Yet these principles need to be aligned with clear ethical foundations. As such, agile 
governance should also be guided by the following normative principles:   
Human-centered: Agility can also enable policymaking that is more inclusive and “human-
centred” by involving more stakeholders in the process and allowing for rapid iteration to 
meet the needs of the governed.  
Inclusive: Inclusion may seem at odds with the interpretations of agile, which anticipate 
increases in speed. While more timely experimentation and decision-making may be 
warranted in many cases, agile governance does not privilege speed over the duty of public 
and private governance processes to empower and protect those they serve.  
Sustainable: Agile governance can also ensure long-term sustainability by creating 
mechanisms to constantly monitor and “upgrade” the policies governing emerging 
technologies, as well as by sharing the workload with private sector and civil society to 
maintain the relevant checks and balances.  
Flexible and adaptable: Agility is by its very nature flexible and adaptable. Incorporating these 
qualities into innovative governance should be at the forefront of regulatory design 
principles.  
Innovative and creative approaches to designing and implementing tools are required for 
agile governance to be achieved in practice. To date governance tools used in agile 
governance include: 
• Policy Labs 
• Regulatory sandboxes 
• Crowd-sourced policymaking 
• Collaboration between regulators and innovators 
• Direct representation in governance 
• Cross-industry self-regulation 
• Ethical standards and local responsibility 
• Collaborative governance eco-systems 
• Transparency and trust building mechanisms 
35 
   
   
 
The combination of systems and design thinking provides an iterative and cumulative 
learning process by exploring a complex and fast-moving ecosystem, sense-making of 
observed variables, and shaping of possible outcomes, while analysing the influence of those 
outcomes on the status quo. Using collective and collaborative models will create a 
governance environment that has reflexivity and feedback loops. However, for agile 
governance to be successful new mind-sets are necessary. Governance must become a multi-
stakeholder endeavour that is inclusive, transparent and participatory. Greater informed 
citizen participation, partnerships and responsible and responsive leadership is needed for 
this to be achieved. Leadership in four areas is necessary for agile governance to take hold: 
technology; governance; values; and systems.  
The 4IR is setting the world community new challenges that require a new governance 
approach. Agile governance combines elements of traditional governance with innovative, 
flexible and adaptive tools that are founded on guiding principles from both the technical and 
the policymaking communities. Technology is disrupting the existing governance order and 




   
   
 
Break-Out Session: Making Governance Agile 
Facilitator: Dr Leonie Tanczer is a Lecturer in International Security 
and Emerging Technologies at STEaPP. Leonie is former Fellow at the 
Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society in Berlin. 
She studied Political Science (BA) at the University of Vienna and 
University of Limerick (Republic of Ireland) and Political Psychology 
(MSc) at Queen's University Belfast where she also completed a PhD 
student at the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics on the 
(in)securitisation of hacking and hacktivism. 
Problem Identification 
As Nicholas Davis’ keynote emphasised, agile governance will only be successful if new mind 
sets are fostered and developed. This is key for individuals who are engaged across the four 
leadership areas: technology; governance; values; and systems. There needs to be capacity 
building and skills development amongst leaders in these areas if agile governance systems 
are to be put into play. One way to develop innovative thinking skills is to enable creative 
problem identification and problem-solving environments bringing together different 
communities of practitioners around the same table. This break-out session uses a simulation 
exercise to provide such an environment for the workshop participants.  a simulation exercise 
to provide such an environment for the workshop participants.  
Method 
This two-hour long break-out session was structured around the questions of “what needs to 
be done” and “how” to make governance agile. It was designed to proactively explore areas 
for collaboration and synergy between the technical and the policy community and was 
centred on a structured exercise designed especially for the session.  
The exercise made use of a worksheet (see: Figure 1) through which focus group discussions 
across five different groups (each with approximately 3-5 participants) were coordinated. 
These focus groups were asked to address the following four issues: 
1. Outcomes: What are the positive outcomes of enhancing the engagement between 
the policy and technical community? 
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2. Needs: What will be needed to enable the successful delivery and achievement of 
these outcomes? 
3. Problem Areas: What are the challenges that hinder the achievement of the proposed 
outcomes?  
4. List of Actions: What concrete action points need to be implemented to address the 
stated problem areas and ensure the achievement of the outcomes?  
Figure 1: Exercise Hand-Out Break-Out Session 2  
(Developed in collaboration with Dr Ine Steenmans (STEaPP, UCL) 
 
The groups had 20 minutes to provide responses to each of the four issues and were 
instructed to report back and address two aspects:   
1. Diagnosis: What do you think are the three key problem areas? 
2. Intervention: What are the three key actions that need to be taken? 
The following section summarises the highlighted problem areas and the list of actions that 
were discussed by workshop attendees in each of the groups.  
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Group One  
Problem Areas: 
1. To have a non-ideological debate which helps to build a willingness to talk about 
IoT security.  
2. To build skills and the desire for policymakers to understand IoT security.  
3. To promote the engagement with small and medium size enterprises (SMEs).  
Recommended Actions: 
Group One focused on three different ways to enable a structured and "soft" way of engaging 
with policymakers and technologists:  
1. To build an IoT governance boot camp, similar to cybersecurity boot camps taking 
place globally. This boot camp would be a multi-stakeholder space (e.g., mayors, 
individuals from different sectors working on the local level) and a place where 
one can engage with different representatives who work on various issues, 
including capacity building. The model could be replicated in different spheres 
such as, for example, on the city level. This model would also build some form of 
legitimacy to the engagement between various communities.  
2. Engage with operation centres on the city level to exchange lessons learnt. One 
way to engage with these centres in a more structured way would be through the 
C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group.  
3. To set up workshop and conference structures such as the National and Regional 
Internet Governance Forum (IGF) initiatives that could support this process from 
the national, regional, and international level.  
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Group Two  
Problem areas:  
1. Lack of long-term commitment to initiatives and bodies as well as efforts and 
processes in terms of IoT security.  
2. Lack of Sherpas/facilitators that can liaise between governance, policy, and 
technology communities.  
3. Commitment to diversity and plurality that frequently stand in the way of efficiency 
and the ability to reach conclusions.  
Recommended Actions: 
1. Pursue long-term funding initiatives that could be focused on how to solve IoT 
security, rather than what particular issues need to be solved and addressed.  
2. To ensure a buy-in from existing initiatives to integrate those existing initiatives that 
have certain constituent followers to be included in any future proposed scheme.  
3. To offer training for facilitators to talk and interpret the language of technology and 
policy communities. Training should also focus on how to involve citizens in IoT 
security processes. Training should be inclusive and the impact of initiatives and 
technologies assessed so lessons can be learnt and incorporated into subsequent 
training.  
 
Group Three  
Problem Areas: 
1.  A prevailing "fear of being shut down" for speaking out. This leads to an unwillingness 
to engage because one is worried about the consequences of speaking up. This is a 
process that is evident both in both the policy and technical communities.  
2. Another problem is the scope of the working group and is centred on the issue that 
one can "go too far with diversity". This problem is evident in existing operational 
working groups (e.g., the IGF). The issue with diversity is that one has too many voices 
that can lead to the discussion becoming too messy and disciplinary opaque.  
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3. There are too few incentives to bridge the gap between policymakers and 
technologists. It is often difficult to get people out of their professional ‘comfort 
zones’. There needs to be professional development incentives to change the mind 
set in both the technical and policymaking communities.  
Recommended Actions: 
1. To produce a "Code of Conduct" using a bottom-up approach and be supported by 
facilitators. Abiding by the Code of Conduct will require a cultural shift in many 
technical and policymaking communities.  
2. To tackle the disciplinary messiness, one has to ensure that the right people are in the 
room.  
3. To offer more incentives to bridge the gap between policymakers and technologists. 
 
Group Four  
Problem Areas: 
1. Frequently not the right people are in the same room.  
2. Too many negative externalities, for instance companies are pushing insecure 
products on the market and are not able to bear the liability nor the cost and 
inconvenience resulting from them.  
3. Perverse incentives in the process. Often the regulatory environment gives some 
stakeholders an incentive to get involved in discussion processes and to lobby for their 
perspective which will ultimately benefit only them.  
Recommended Actions: 
1. Reduce barriers to stakeholder participation to help get the right people in the same 
room at the same time. How should this be done? 
a. Appoint a “proxy" to deal with stakeholders who cannot attend meetings;  
b. Establish a sponsorship or fellowship scheme for less well-resourced 
stakeholders. They should feed any of the learned insights back into their 
countries or communities.  
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c. Distribute simplified materials to users physically and directly e.g. via schools 
and/or roadshows.  
2. To tackle the negative externalities and perverse incentives one should underline the 
incentives. If there are negative externalities one should try to close the loop. Hence, 
the negative effects should be fed back to the entities that caused them. An analogy 
for this action point could be the process of recycling plastic bottles or recyclable cans 
where the drinks provider assumes responsibility for the management throughout its 
lifecycle. 
3. To go to the user instead of expecting them to come to the process. To do this, one 
should recruit the "David Attenborough of IoT". The latter can be the face of IoT 
security. S/he can convene the message, can be put on Youtube, is on documentaries 
and has a virtual presence.  
Group Five  
Problem Areas: 
The group’s suggestions were all about power, knowledge, and interest. 
1. Lack of cross-fertilisation between disciplines, as well as policymakers / government 
and technology, at the senior level.  
2. Language and assumption problem: Both communities do not share the same 
language and have different assumptions about each other's motivations. 
3. Lack of trust between both communities and a persistent belief that “the other side” 
is lacking necessary expertise.  
Recommended Actions: 
1. The engagement on the junior level should be complemented with high-level 
secondments of people who have both the mobility and influence to evangelise their 
organisation. A concrete action to achieve this would be to draft a two-
dimensional stakeholder mapping that draws on a power vs. interest matrix. This 
way, capable individuals who are also willing to strike a balance between both 
communities can be identified.  
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2. To address the language and assumption problem, Group 5 proposed the "Helter 
Skelter" exercise. The idea of Helter Skelter came from the Beatles song where band 
members swapped instruments. Policy Makers would design a user interface in the 
role of Technologists. They would then invite Technologists to play in the role of Policy 
Makers and attempt to write a policy describing the system’s correct usage. There 
would then be some ensuing discussions about how it went. Basically, it is intended to 
provide an opportunity for the two disciplines to wear each other’s shoes for a day. 
There will be friction but ultimately the exercise is designed to help foster amongst 
both groups a shared vocabulary.  
3. To tackle the trust and expertise issue, Group 5 has developed a "Fried Egg" exercise. 
The activity involves going into separate rooms (policymakers in one, technologists in 
another) and both groups reflecting on their expertise as well as stating "what do we 
know" (i.e., their core expertise). Additionally, both groups state what one knows 
about the other group's expertise. Then each group develops their own 'fried egg' (a 
bubble that is one colour and characterises the groups' core expertise; and a bubble 
that is another colour that describes the others group's expertise). The exercise 
ensures that technologists and policymakers can compare their 'fried eggs' which 
should support trust building and allows both groups to fill each other’s knowledge 
gaps.  
The session resulted in some creative proposals. The problem areas and the list of actions 
identified here provide useful pointers on how to best influence and frame the agenda for 
follow up workshops and meetings. They provide a “cookbook” for policymakers and 
technologists who are both equally encouraged to make use of the insights derived from this 
break-out session. They are aimed at helping to reduce the barrier of engagement and 
incentivise the bridging of a long-standing gap between both communities. Measures such as 
the implementation of Codes of Conduct, the simplification of language, as well as exercises 
such as the Helter Skelter might not be the only solutions to address the problem areas during 
the workshop. Nonetheless, based on the activities conducted during the workshop, 
participants feel confident that they provide a stepping stone towards a more open encounter 
between these technologists and policymakers, both of which in the current climate should 
be speaking and engaging with each other.  
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Conclusions  
If the increased economic and non-economic values of incorporating the Internet of Things 
(IoT) into the world are to be realised then knowledge and information needs to be 
communicated more effectively between communities – both the technical and the policy-
making – to address cybersecurity risks. Society will not trust IoT systems that put at risk their 
security. Neither will they tolerate institutions whose governance models fail to protect them 
from cyber-harms. A great deal is at stake both in the public sector and the private sector as 
emerging technologies rapidly alter the governance landscape. A business as usual approach 
to cooperation between the technical community and policy makers is no longer fit for 
purpose.  
The workshop on ‘Governance and Policy Cooperation on the Cyber Security of the Internet 
of Things’ revealed a number of fundamental flaws that currently threaten the successful 
adoption of emerging technologies. It also laid out useful stepping stones to use to actively 
foster capacity building and skills development, between and across all communities to 
deliver a future that works for all.  
Introducing the workshop Dr Madeline Carr (STEaPP, UCL) highlighted two truths to guide 
participants through the activities and discussions. The first truth being the success that the 
technical community had experienced over 25 years, and continue to experience, to build a 
multilevel agile, innovative and effectively coordinated governance framework for digital 
technology. Yet this occurred with limited involvement from the policy-making community 
leaving a legacy of misunderstandings, tensions and at times hostile relations.  The second 
truth is that technology is political - innovation always has economic, social and 
environmental implications that privilege some whilst putting others at a disadvantage. Nick 
Davis (World Economic Forum) observed that existing governance models developed prior to 
the digital age are unable to resolve the multilevel complexities that emerging technologies 
like the IoT bring. Governance systems need to be reformed for the digital age, yet this cannot 
solely be left to policy-makers because future governance systems will depend on emerging 
technologies to govern. This dilemma was acknowledged by Dr Apostolos Malatras (ENISA) 
who highlighted the ongoing failure to build cross-community understanding and dialogue to 
more effectively communicate the vital information and knowledge needed to secure the 
future of emerging technologies in society.  
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The session coordinated by Dr Irina Brass (STEaPP, UCL) brought to the fore the divergent 
views that exist in determining problems, identifying questions and agreeing on criteria and 
processes to address security issues for certificate and labelling schemes amongst the 
technical and policy-making communities.  Participants emphasised the need to adopt new 
dialogues, new stories to communicate with users, question the limitations of established 
systems such as checklists and promote informed consensus to arrive at a middle-way. The 
outcomes from Dr Leonie Tanzcer’s (STEaPP, UCL) session, which focused on promoting more 
agile governance, underscored the importance of long-term commitment (including funding), 
representative diversity, training and dedicated centres of excellence to foster innovative 
approaches and to build skills and capacity across all sectors and at all levels.  Agile 
governance, a concept promoted by the World Economic Forum, needs ethically informed 
innovative regulatory processes and mechanisms to deliver outcomes that are human 
centred, inclusive and sustainable.  
The workshop demonstrated a consensus between the technical community and policy-
making community that cooperation is currently sub-optimal. The major obstacles to 
improving cooperation primarily lie in a long-standing failure to communicate effectively. 
Building knowledge spaces to bring the technical and policy-making communities together is 
vital to achieving transformations in governance to achieve outcomes that are politically 
acceptable for all. Engagement will only come about if there is active commitment to deliver 
using existing forums in innovative ways, creating new forums and spaces and using language 
that is inclusive to communicate ideas, concepts and processes.  
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